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The executive retains power through the intentional ambiguity of the “war” metaphor – the “war on terror” identifies no definitive enemy but instead provides the president the authority to characterize it as a metaphorical “war of ideas” or a struggle against “extremism” – the figurative becomes the literal as the perceived reality of conditions of war support the need for the “war” metaphor – the resulting confusion between contingent definitions of war and policies’ justification of force against indistinct enemies makes war powers expansion inevitable.

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The U.S. war on terrorism, as it was being constructed during the George W. Bush administration, differed from the other wars that we have considered in some obvious and significant respects. Most fundamentally, while those were initiated in response to a perceived evil found within the body of the nation, the war on terrorism took as its primary target already-organized foreign groups, and centrally an organization that had itself identified as an enemy of the United States. With respect to these groups, the war on terrorism did not, then, need to play the same role in constructing the state or the enemy. Yet the representation of the enemy was never limited to these groups; and the Bush administration and its congressional allies not only claimed a much broader scope for the war overseas but also sought to open up as well a domestic front in that war, expansively conceived. In doing so, it extended yet further that tendency that we noted in the war on crime and drugs: toward modeling certain areas of criminal law on a war between the true body politic and its domestic enemies. It is this internalization of the war of terrorism with which I shall be concerned here. After the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration attempted to obtain from Congress a resolution giving the President expansive authority to “deter and pre-empt future acts of terrorism.”54 Although the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that Congress (AUMF) adopted restricted the use of force to those who had “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of 9/11 or “harbored such organizations or persons,”55 the administration promptly recharacterized it as a declaration of an abstract “war on terror.” In his statement accompanying the signing of the resolution, for example, President Bush described the enemy in broad terms: as the “scourge of terrorism directed against the United States and its interests.”56 And in his Military Order two months later, which relied for its authority in part on the AUMF, the President established a system of military tribunals for the “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”57 with broad authority to detain and try any noncitizen whom the President determined it would be “in the interest of the United States . . . [to make] subject to this order.” From the beginning, the administration’s representation of the war was somewhat ambiguous with respect to whether it was metaphorical or literal. Literally, of course, (as has been pointed out commonly enough) one cannot declare war against a tactic. Moreover, the Bush administration would at times find it advantageous, particularly in seeking to expand the scope of the “global war on terror,” to stress its metaphorical character: describing it, for instance, not merely as a war against certain groups, but more broadly as “a war of ideas”58 and a general struggle against “violent extremism”59 or even just “extremism.”60 At the same time, the assertion by the administration of broad executive war powers to hold indefinitely any person it claimed to be an “international terrorist” or to “support such terrorists”61 (and the broad statutory grants that were ultimately given to the executive to detain and try through military commissions a broad category of “enemy combatants”62) depended on treating the war very much as a literal one. Yet the notion that the President has unilateral authority to decide to (for example) detain anyone he classifies as an enemy combatant in a war for which the “battlefield” (as one senior administration official put it) “is everywhere”63 is extraordinary; and it is therefore not surprising that when required to justify the scope of its authority in court, the Bush administration frequently equivocated on whether the literal war for which it claimed war powers was a global war on terrorism or a more narrowly circumscribed and (somewhat) more conventional war in Afghanistan, Iraq, or against al Qaeda.64 If this continuing and intentional ambiguity between the metaphorical and the literal helped to evade serious consideration of the implications of a modern, liberal state (and further the executive of a constitutional state) declaring a literal war on terrorism, global in scope and permanent in duration, the evasion of that question was aided as well though the second kind of ambiguity that we have discussed, concerning the nature of the “declaration” of the war itself. While on the one hand, then, the administration claimed authority derived from the AUMF as a declaration that put the United States in a stance of war against various enemies, including “terrorism” in general, the administration and its supporters also suggested that it was not the United States that (exercitively) declared war on “terrorism,” but that “[j]ust as . . . [it was] the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor” that established “a state of war . . . between the United States and the Empire of Japan . . . so, too,” the war on terrorism existed “immediately following the 9/11 attacks upon the United States”—65 or even that before then, “terrorists were at war with us”66—and that Congress’s resolution was nothing more than its “official recognition of a state of war”67 already in existence. If the war against terrorism is not a war that the nation has initiated, but a condition in which the country finds itself, it is easier to avoid the question of what it would mean to declare a literal war against such an enemy. And here again we see the synergy of the two ambiguities that I have identified. In the very slippage between the exercitive act of establishing a condition of war and the verdictive act of recognizing an existing condition, the idea of a war of terrorism slides more easily toward the literal. In asserting broad powers to fight “terrorism” wherever it existed, the administration and its supporters did not distinguish in principle between foreign and domestic exercises of that power or between citizens and aliens. The administration thus asserted a right to “capture” and detain those whom it called unlawful enemy combatants equally on American soil and overseas. And the Military Commissions Act of 2006, though it did distinguish between aliens and citizens, authorized the administration to try in a military tribunal any alien engaged in what it broadly termed “hostilities against the United States” for a wide range of what would otherwise be simple crimes, including what it called (without further definition) “attacks” on civilian property.68 But if on the one hand, the war on terrorism was used as justification for removing certain persons and acts from the criminal justice system, on the other, the war on terrorism was incorporated into the criminal law. The USA PATRIOT Act, for example, gave the FBI the authority to obtain, without a warrant or the need to provide any supporting evidence to a court, “any tangible things” as part of an investigation of either citizens or noncitizens, merely by asserting that it was acting to “protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”69 The term “clandestine intelligence activity” was left undefined, while the definition of “international terrorism” was expanded (by removing the existing requirement that it involve “assassination or kidnapping”) to include any action that “transcends national boundaries” or is committed by a person “operat[ing]” across international lines if it “appear[s] to be intended” to “influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion,” if it could be “dangerous” to human life, and if it violates any “of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State.”70 (There is no requirement that the violation of law be for the purpose of “intimidation or coercion,” that there be an intent to endanger human life, or that any person be actually harmed.) The same definition, without the international requirement, was then employed in establishing a new category of “domestic terrorism,” which, along with “international terrorism,” became the basis for a number of other new legal penalties and liabilities, including asset forfeiture.71 We cannot know how expansively this category of terrorism, with its special procedures and penalties, will be treated in the future. But on a broad reading of such terms as “coercion” and “dangerous,” it could easily end up including, for example, civil disobedience and other forms of protest that directly or incidentally involve violation of some federal or state crime. (Had this definition of domestic terrorism been in place during the civil rights movement, it is difficult to believe that it would not have been construed by the FBI to include the use of what Martin Luther King referred to as “direct action” intended “to . . . create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.”72) The FBI’s counterterrorism division has already moved very much in this direction, adopting, for example, a broad definition of “ecoterrorism” as any “use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally oriented subnational group for environmental–political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature”—such as Greenpeace’s cutting of drift nets used by commercial fishing operations.73 In the broadest version of it, and the version toward which the Bush administration was increasingly moving, the domestic war on terrorism tended toward identifying the nation with the entirety of the existing structure of state power, policy, and law, while including as enemies of the nation those who commit any violations of the law as part of a political or social movement to pressure a government or a private entity to change policy. To the extent that the war on terrorism is treated as a literal war, the implications of defining the nation and its enemies in this way are daunting.74

#### The traditional concept of peace doesn’t exist – war powers mandate social systems to declare war on one population to create peace for another – reflection on the conceptual state of war precedes instrumental solutions.

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It is not simply wrong to argue that the difference between war and its other is disappearing. There is plenty of evidence for the overlap between the practices of war and the practices of peace in the contemporary world. Yet, this view is not complete or complex enough to provide a truly telling insight into the problem of war, especially in its current form. I want now to turn to a series of thinkers who, while acknowledging the inter-penetration of war and its other in the contemporary world, have also provided a more nuanced account of how that complex is experienced or what it might mean.¶ Although he includes the War on Terror in his discussion, to Achille Mbembe, it is the colonial war that is the archetype of the state of war in the contemporary. In Mbembe, the distinction between war and peace, as well as between state and non-state combatants, has broken down, leaving the identity of war itself in crisis. This is the flipside of the crisis of the thinking of the social we derived at the end of our discussion of Derrida. The increasing difficulty of defining a clear distinction between war and its other produces a crisis in the definition of war as much as of the social.¶ Mbembe’s aim is to reveal a style of sovereignty whose function is not the achievement of political autonomy, but “the generalised instrumentalisation of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 14). He thus goes beyond accounts of sovereignty as the state of exception, arguing that this is a mere preliminary to the exercise of a “right to kill” (p. 16). Sovereignty then creates “death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring on them the status of living dead” (p. 40). Mbembe argues that one of the central critiques of modernity has focussed on the “complete conflation of war and politics” (p. 18), identified with Nazism. The historical origins of the logic the Nazis put into practice, however, is to be found in colonialism. The colonial—and later apartheid systems— gave rise to a “unique terror formation” displaying a “concatenation of biopower, the state of exception and the state of siege” (p. 22). Mbembe goes on: “the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law . . . and where ‘peace’ is more likely to take on the face of a ‘war without end’ ” (p. 23). In this context, “the distinction between war and peace does not avail” (p.25). Colonial war does not simply aim at the pacification of the colony. War – whether enacted through explicit armed conflict or through the uninterrupted terrorisation of the local population, or through processes of administration that divide communities, uproot crops and orchards, hold populations in indefinite bureaucratic paralysis (at permit offices and check-points), disable economic relationships or explicitly arrest, detain and kill arbitrarily – becomes colonial normality. “The fiction of a distinction between ‘the ends of war’ and ‘the means of war’ collapses” (p. 25).¶ Mbembe evokes Deleuze and Guattari’s trope of the “war-machine” to describe the related death-world where warfare has become dissociated from the state. He uses Africa as an example: ¶ Here, the political economy of statehood dramatically changed over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Many African states can no longer claim a monopoly on violence and on the means of coercion within their territory. Nor can they claim a monopoly on territorial boundaries. Coercion itself has become a market commodity. Military fighting power [sic] is bought and sold on a market in which the identity of suppliers and purchasers means almost nothing. Urban militias, private armies, armies of regional lords, private security firms, and state armies all claim the right to exercise violence or to kill. Neighbouring states or rebel movements lease armies to poor states. Nonstate deployers of violence supply two critical coercive resources: labour and minerals. Increasingly, the vast majority of armies are composed of citizen soldiers: child soldiers, mercenaries and privateers. (Mbembe, 2003, p. 32) ¶ We have witnessed how such arrangements, entangled with struggles over resources destined for western markets, from diamonds to the opium poppy, quickly establish themselves in regions where the state has been destabilised and becomes only a bit-player, like Afghanistan and Iraq. It would be naïve to find [sic] such a model becoming generalised directly, but given that the consequences of climate change remain unpredictable, and the tenor of Mbembe’s argument is that what happens in the post-colonial world might be repeated in the supposedly developed world (colony prefigures camp), it would be foolish therefore to dismiss these developments as of only local interest.¶ Herfried Münkler picks up this very point in an account of The New Wars. Citing Trutz von Throta, Münkler speculates about whether the present state of war in Africa might say more about the future of the developed world than its past (Münkler, 2005, p. 34). The analogy between an autonomous, self-motivating and more or less continuous war that simply feeds off itself and the War on Terror—let alone the wars declared in western societies on drugs, crime, poverty and so on—is hard to resist. How does Münkler characterise these wars? They are first and foremost wars without noticeable beginning and achievable end. “They begin somehow or other, and end somewhere or other. Scarcely any of the parties can say clearly which purposes and aims are being pursued by means of the war” (p. 33). Many of the processes of the legitimate daylight global economy and culture feed this propensity to war. The new wars are fed by their “insertion into the process of economic globalisation or shadow globalisation, and the development of new constellations of interests geared not to the ending of war but to its theoretically endless continuation” (pp. 32–3). The distinction between combatants and non-combatants breaks down (p. 15), exposing women in particular to a sexual violence now used unambiguously as a weapon of terror and ethnic domination. Indeed, Münkler draws attention to “the extensive sexualisation of violence that is observable in nearly all the new wars” (p. 86). Strategic goals fade in the face of an “economy . . . of violence . . . one big torture machine whose purpose is to produce pain and suffering but not to enforce a political will” (p. 86).¶ This development in which war has become a self-generating activity is perhaps the most explicit repudiation we have met of Clausewitz’s instrumentalist account of warfare. Again, Münkler reads it as symptomatic of a structural crisis in contemporary sociality. The supposed modern rules of warfare, established at the end of the Thirty Years’ War, in which states co-existed inside agreed boundaries and exercised a monopoly on violence within their own territory, are really what is at stake in the new wars. A generalised and irregular warfare, which preceded the formation of the state, now returns at the other end of the period of rational warfare, where the state is starting to break down: [T]here is also the question of whether [the new wars] can in a sense be described as a return to a stage prior to Europe’s early modern statization of war; a look at that earlier period is a suitable way of bringing out similarities with the conditions in which the state is no longer what it was then not yet: the monopolist of war. (Münkler, 2005, p. 2)¶ This spread of war sweeps up even the organisations whose aim is to bring peace, such as international aid agencies, which get caught up in the economy of war by making resources available that can swiftly end up on the black market: “what was supposed to relieve hunger and poverty becomes a resource of war” (p. 18). Yet, this model of a continuous war “with neither an identifiable beginning or a clearly defined end” (p. 15) also describes wars in which states are now engaged. The war in Iraq and the War on Terror, as well as the generalised use of warfare as the language of social policy, prove [sic] the limits of the instrumentalist account of war. Torture, extraordinary rendition, imprecise bombing, rape, as well as the intensification of police action, legislation to restrict press freedom and civil and human rights more generally, all find [sic] the state spreading terror, executing arbitrary power, cultivating heightened social division and insinuating suspicion into social relations. It is, of course, arguable that this has always been a resource to which the state has easily and readily turned, and Derrida, for example, has argued that all states are by definition “rogue states” (Derrida, 2005). However, what we find [sic] now is not the use of these techniques in pursuit of specific social goals (economic, geopolitical or racial domination, for example), but as a substitute for sociality in general, in a social, even global, war without term. Terror becomes not a tool, but a form of continuous tension, from which some may profit, while others remain cowed. As Mbembe’s description of the Israeli occupation of Palestine outlines, this kind of war soon becomes normalised, a state of constant intimidation and emergency. The wars on drugs and crime that have dominated social policy in certain western countries achieve nothing more than this state of permanent unsettling of the social order.¶ Here, we find [sic] the historical realisation of a non-Clausewitzian version of war. The generalisation of war as a type of peace with peace’s aims shows that the deconstruction of the war/peace and friend/enemy dichotomies we have outlined in Derrida is not simply a piece of abstruse theorising. The historical situation in which we live is not one where war and its other are clear alternatives. Given we are in a perpetual state of low-level conflict in which acts of war and the rhetoric of the social combine with one another in complex ways, it is chimerical to even believe that the tangle can be rationalised into discrete alternatives wherein we can actually withdraw our troops, pressure our governments, discipline our corporations and pacify our popular culture in order to construct an enduring peace. As we have found [sic], this tangle persists in our understandings of what society is, even when they attempt to simplify it. Mbembe and Münkler show that this situation is not merely theoretical.¶ It is thus too simple to think of [sic] this complex state of affairs as simply the implementation of policy, as the widespread reference to Clausewitz would imply, nor as merely the erasure of difference between war and its other. The generalisation of war as Mbembe and Münkler describe it reveals a world in which the intensification of war in one place—one part of the world or fraction of society—has as its aim the consolidation of peace in another. Violence in the occupied zone or the failed state coincides with the uninhibited extension of luxury and security elsewhere. The sacralisation of the victims of the September 11 attacks, when viewed in a global context, is evidence of a society unable to believe that the violence it was accustomed to witness, even enact, elsewhere could be visited on its very heartland. The sense of outrage, even injustice, this provoked is illustrative of a global situation where violence is normalised but not evenly spread. The spreading administration of violence in one place is the securing of peace elsewhere, and it is this very contradiction that allows the violence to be rationalised. This then confirms the deconstructive account in which war and peace only attain their co-ordination because of the irreducible disjunction between them.¶

#### We must understand war as constantly evolving – attempting to strive for peace ignores that war is always the medium – understanding war as an unstable concept allows for adaptation of political understanding to cope with the political uncertainty of the future.

- Our current conditions of war can’t be changed if we don’t seek to understand war itself.

War as a term can only be defined in relation to its opposite, such as peace, love, et cetera, BUT that opposite is always changing.

Rejection of war in favor of its opposites ignores how war is always fought in the name of realizing these states of peace.

The future will inevitably bring new social, political problems that will be impossible to address with one grand solution.

Instead we must understand war not as a stable concept but as ever evolving.

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The aim of this book has been to show that war is always defined in relation to something else, what we have called its other. This other may vary: it may be society, sovereign authority, politics, love, peace, friendship or something else. What is important about this relationship is not that it defines what war is opposite to and distinct from nor does it simply identify what the mechanism is that uses war as an instrument. It reveals the context within which war must emerge. This is not simply the historical or political context. Historical context is important, of course. Each thinker that we have studied can be said to be reacting to the specific war that defined or dominated their era: Hobbes, the religious and civil wars of the seventeenth century; Clausewitz, the wars of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era, in which the people became a major player for the first time; Freud, the First World War; Foucault, the war of the racial Holocaust; Virilio, the Cold War of Mutually Assured Destruction; Baudrillard, the First Gulf War; Žižek, the War on Terror and so on. Sometimes this address is direct and conscious; sometimes implicit and incidental. Their accounts, however, emerge in more than an historical context: they rely on a conceptual context as well, in which war is not just a literal material situation, but an abstraction or an idea. This is what makes war available as part of the unfolding of human meaning. In this way, war itself is not the problem. It is the way war is implicated in and required by other denominations of human meaning that condemns us to repeated bouts of official violence. War never emerges outside of a relationship to some conceptual other, and it is in the complexity of this relationship that our future fortunes of war will be determined.¶ As we have found [sic], this relationship can never be thought [sic] to stabilise simply around the idea that war and its other are opposites or merely continuous with one another. Even in the accounts of Hobbes and Kant, for example, the idea that war and civil society are opposites proves to be a much more complex argument than it at first appears: in the Hobbesian version, we find that civil society may seem to supplant the natural state of war, but is in fact, the fulfilment of war’s ostensible purposes. In Kant, peace emerges as a progression beyond war, but only by way of it. In both these arguments, the relationship between war and peace is not one of simple contrast, but of complex entanglement, in which peace never quite leaves war behind, indeed continues to depend on it. In our time, on the other hand, we find [sic]f a kind of Clausewitzian consensus, in which war is thought of [sic] as co-ordinated with both international diplomatic and domestic social policy, as a vast para-military police action in which unruly lapsed allies are disciplined or various kinds of social deviancy defined and excoriated. Theorists are quick to argue that what we find [sic] here is the increasing disappearance of any difference between war and its other. Yet, while this generalisation of war seems to be taking place, at no time has war been less publicly acceptable nor more automatically rejected—even indiscriminately and pre-emptively—by vast sections of the population. The generalised moral revulsion at war is not a real obstacle to war nor does it herald its demise. Indeed, while their constituents demonstrate against wars and ridicule them on blogs, politicians seem paralysed when it comes to contesting the determination of heads of government to resort to warfare. As Ryan C Hendrickson has argued in The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress and War Powers (Hendrickson, 2002), the US Congress has been increasingly reluctant to resist the will of a president who has decided on military action, even when it has the constitutional power to do so. The general revulsion at war therefore is not necessarily incompatible with a generalisation of war in practice. Indeed, my aim has been to show the opposite: that the general deployment and the general rejection of war are part of a single complex. It is much too simple, however, to find [sic] this complex as part of a willing ignorance [sic] on the part of the bulk of humanity, wherein moral comfort and self-regard would be assured by rejection of war even though affluent lifestyles may depend on war for their continued opportunity. It is too easy to think of [sic] the war problem simply morally, that we play at rejecting wars from which we are actually happy to profit. Our rejection of war, like our purported commitment to democracy and human rights, is not merely hypocritical. It must be understood as part of a complex in which war and its other emerge together in a double relationship in which they both encourage and refuse one another: we reject war because it ruins social relations, shatters bodies and savages our human rights. Yet, we also look to war to preserve the social, protect threatened lives and enlarge rights. War kills and saves simultaneously. It destroys the things in the name of which it is implemented. To think of [sic] a loss of difference between war and its other is to overlook the complex situations in which war emerges and which keep it alive despite our moral repugnance and endless official lamentations for those of us whom it has annihilated.¶ To say that war is double and that it is implicated conceptually in other values that we want to preserve is not to simply say that we should be resigned to war enduring. It is an attempt to provide a new and useful way by which war can be understood, and argues, as all analysis does, that material situations like war cannot be dealt with if they are not understood, and that new ways must continually be sought to rethink them. Theory is not an enduring ideal truth to be applied to practical situations, but the invention of new conceptual forms that may help us represent and explain hitherto obscure or enigmatic phenomena. Thinking of war in terms of the war/other complex means always understanding [sic] the emergence of war as the deployment of something else with it. The two must always appear in relationship with one another even if they are considered to be antagonistic or mutually destructive. So war and whatever its other might be in a particular context, facilitate the emergence of one another, even in their defiance of one another. It is this inseparability of war and its other that makes it possible to understand [sic] war and its other as co-ordinated. What was Nazi war but a tribute, in its most organised and exultant murderousness, to life? What was Communist insurgency but the most regimented and anonymous embrace of the possibilities of freedom? And what are democracy’s post-1989 wars but the most brutal and oppressive attempt to spread human rights?¶ These complex situations can and should not be disguised by an eternal but vacuous resort to morality. The logic that attributes the doubleness of war to hypocrisy is a singularly unenlightening example of the ascendancy of moral discourse in discussions of war. Of course, our attitude to war must be moral: we could not protect ourselves from the cult of official violence if it were not, nor could we begin to understand [sic] war as a problem and something to be surpassed, something I have assumed as relatively uncontentious from the outset. Yet, because war is politically, economically, and above all, conceptually situated, it must be recognised not as primarily a moral, but a political problem. Since the Vietnam War, resistance to war has been fundamentally based on revulsion at its violence and destructiveness and the popular culture that naturalise it. This resistance has been primarily rhetorical and gestural, as it befits its interest in the aesthetics of war and in tune with the general aestheticisation of politics of the time. It has rested on general humanist clichés about community, fraternity and an ideal social future. In other words, it has relied on a banal and unsustainable understanding of the mutual alienation of the human and war. This conception is not wrong in any simple sense, but it is too uncomplicated to deal with the dynamics of the war/other complex, in which the human can be as much a justification for war as reason for scepticism towards it, and is indeed probably both. To engage with war properly, we have to realise that this kind of opposition is not enough. When war is in play, so is something else, war’s various others. Humanist sentimentality often attempts to present what we have identified as war’s others as unquestionable or non-negotiable: How can we possibly contest the value implicit in love, or sociality or human rights? Is not this the worst kind of post-modern relativism, in which we allow what should be absolute values to be held up for debate? Yet it is these various “values” that accompany and facilitate the emergence of war, and that always wrong-foot us when we attempt to reject it. Do we not want dictators to be removed, women’s rights restored and ethnic cleansing resisted? If we are in favour of these goals, how can we resist the wars that aim to achieve them? Does not this make the rejection of war merely automatic and adolescent?¶ The refusal to debate these values results in both an impotent and unworldly rejection of war, on the one hand, and a mindless acquiescence to it, on the other. The argument of this book has been that it is necessary to understand the complexity of the implication of such values in war. This understanding requires the courage to rethink these values and the political will to engage unsentimentally with their historical function. Questioning war must involve a questioning of the very things in the name of which wars are fought, not in order simply to reject them, but to engage properly with their real historical and political function. If you are unwilling to deal with this dynamic and seek mere recourse to absolute rejections of war, or absolute endorsement of the values that oppose (and/or allow) war, then you risk remaining stuck in the cycle from which politics should always be attempting to free us. Just because they have failed us and have proven corrupt, easily intimidated and willingly compromised, we should not exempt parliaments from being one place amongst others where such politics should take place. In short, wherever it happens, the politics of war must also provide a properly critical account of war’s other.¶ Our inherited models of politics have opted either for the grand narrative approach to the realisation of optimal ideological goals or else a molecularism, in which social fractions either withstand or disrupt the forces attempting to limit them. The first relies on a model of a uniform and collective trajectory of human development, which can no longer be sustained, as well as having a weak understanding of what Foucault so ably identified as the “regional” (Foucault, 2003, p. 27) way in which power operates. The second fails to produce more general insight into the dynamics of human collectivity, the politics of the economic in particular. The pitting of these two models of politics against one another defined post-modern debate. Yet, we may be now confronting a political epoch in which neither of these ways of thinking about politics helps us: the first because it aims to recover an older sense of human universality that is long gone, irrecoverable, ineffective and probably already unlamented; the second because the radical disruption of identity and administration, however relevant it remains to challenging the silent violence of culture, policy and social institutions, will not reassemble the sites of collective intention, scrutiny and negotiation that we will need in order to deal with the challenges of the politics of climate change—economic activity discovering its final limits, the resulting dislocation of human populations inequitably experienced, the threat of states acting unilaterally to secure their interests regardless of the consequences and so on. What we will be confronting will be a series of situations that will not be easily assimilable to theoretical models developed in wholly different contexts, co-ordinated as they were, first, with the expansion and, then, the contraction of Western historicity. This future could well produce a set of unfolding or overlapping crises in which wars develop. It will be absolutely crucial to understand the dynamic behind these wars: What are they being fought for? It may be true that globalisation will not result in the liquidation of the nation state, as Hirst and others have argued. Yet, in the twenty-first century, however pragmatically persistent the nation state may be, it lacks any enduring sense of natural inevitability, and contests with economic, religious and ethnic allegiances which may co-ordinate with it—from the potentially unknowable flows of capital through an increasingly abstract financial market to the bonds of fundamentalist dogmatism— but which may overwhelm it as well. There is and will continue to be a remaking of the plural relationships that will cluster around a set of unrecognisable warfares. War will not perhaps be the instrument of established social collectivities or an expression of their values, but the thing that brings them into existence in the first place, inventing ideological and dogmatic formations hitherto unknown, or loose coalitions of established national and international institutions. Who will fight which wars in the name of what? As we have found [sic], what gives rise to a war, what justifies it can also define the very point of view from which it can be resisted, not that our attitude to war should always and everywhere be simply one of refusal. Economic security, political rights and even peace are examples of the double constructs in the name of which war can be both defended and critiqued.¶ My argument is that, given the unpredictability of our political future and the superannuation of the political models we have inherited, a theoretical construct like the war/other complex may provide one way in which future situations may be thought not ideologically but pragmatically. Traditionally war has been treated as if it is a discrete event, anticipated by causes and followed by consequences, but a singular thing nevertheless. The war/other complex allows us to think of [sic] war in its embeddedness in the unfolding of global social relations in general. In this way, it may not only provide a more pragmatic way of understanding a future politics, but by reinventing new ways of imagining the collective and the specific dynamic by which it may subsume individual bodies and events, it may take over the function of our previous political paradigms.¶

#### Metaphor is everywhere and unavoidable BUT there are certain metaphors that are detrimental.

The argument-as-war metaphor utilized by debate becomes a form of rhetorical violence that puts participants and critics at odds with each other.

The metaphorical guides the literal as conceptions of argument-as-war makes it so.

Lakoff and Johnson, ‘80 [George Lakoff, Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley; Mark Johnson, Knight Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oregon; excerpt from "Metaphors We Live By"; http://theliterarylink.com/metaphors.html]

Metaphor is for most people device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish--a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.¶ The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we thinks what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor. ¶But our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of. in most of the little things we do every day, we simply think and act more or less automatically along certain lines. Just what these lines are is by no means obvious. One way to find out is by looking at language. Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like.¶ Primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature. And we have found a way to begin to identify in detail just what the metaphors are halt structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do.¶ To give some idea of what it could mean for a concept to be metaphorical and for such a concept to structure an everyday activity, let us start with the concept ARGUMENT and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions:

ARGUMENT IS WAR

Your claims are indefensible.

She [sic] attacked every weak point in my argument.

Her [sic] criticisms were right on target.

I demolished his argument.

I've never won an argument with him.

you disagree? Okay, shoot!

If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.

She [sic] shot down all of my arguments.

It is important to know [sic] that we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We think of [sic] the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument--attack, defense, counter-attack, etc.---reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; its structures the actions we perform in arguing. Try to imagine a culture where arguments are not viewed in terms of war, where no one wins or loses, where there is no sense of attacking or defending, gaining or losing ground. Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are thought of [sic] as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently. But we would probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing something different. It would seem strange even to call what they were doing "arguing." In perhaps the most neutral way of describing this difference between their culture and ours would be to say that we have a discourse form structured in terms of battle and they have one structured in terms of dance. This is an example of what it means for a metaphorical concept, namely, ARGUMENT IS WAR, to structure (at least in part) what we do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things--verbal discourse and armed conflict--and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured. ¶Moreover, this is the ordinary way of having an argument and talking about one. The normal way for us to talk about attacking a position is to use the words "attack a position." Our conventional ways of talking about arguments presuppose a metaphor we are hardly ever conscious of. The metaphors not merely in the words we use--it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way--and we act according to the way we conceive of thing¶The most important claim we have m ade so far is that metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical. This is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined. Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system. Therefore, whenever in this book we speak of metaphors, such as ARGUMENT IS WAR, it should be understood that metaphor means metaphorical concept.¶ THE SYSTEMATICITTY OF METAPHORICAL CONCEPTS¶ Arguments usually follow patterns; that is, there are certain things we typically do and do not do in arguing. The fact that we in part conceptualize arguments in terms of battle systematically influences the shape argument stake and the way we talk about what we do in arguing. Because the metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is systematic.¶We saw in the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor that expressions from the vocabulary of war, e.g., attack a position, indefensible, strategy, new line of attack, win, gain ground, etc., form a systematic way of talking about the battling aspects of arguing. It is no accident that these expressions mean what they mean when we use them to talk about arguments. A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially characterizes file concept of an argument, and the language follows suit. Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities.

#### Vote aff to restrict the power of the war metaphor.

#### Just like there’s no one perfect definition of war, there’s no perfect definition of debate; the activity constitutes a multitude of different things in various contexts. The war metaphor antagonizes debaters and stifles debate’s potential.

#### The meaning behind language is not stagnant, but instead constantly fluctuating.

There are a vast number of replacements to the metaphor of argument as war. Instead of choosing just one, we should expand our rhetorical possibilities and never end the search for how to define and relate to debate.

Cohen, ’95 [Daniel H. Cohen, Ph.D., Philosophy, Indiana University. Professor of Philosophy at Colby College; “Argument is War ... and War is Hell: Philosophy, Education, and Metaphors for Argumentation”; Informal Logic Vol. 17, No.2 (Spring 1995)]

To be sure, there are alternative understandings of argumentation available. I think it completely justified to speak of the progress that has been made in characterizing argumentation by exploiting the resources of speech act theory, critical theory, formal logic, rhetorical analysis, and all the other relevant conceptual tools at our disposal. To take one example, arguments can be characterized in terms of their various linguistic roles or in terms of their effects as conversational episodes. From that perspective, one of the primary functions of an argument is "enhancing the acceptability of the speech act for which it is an argument."9 What I like about this particular formula, besides its succinct elegance, is how it abstracts to a level from which the adversarial element can be regarded as merely an accidental means to a more important end, and thereby allows for other means to that end. It creates room for answers to the question of why someone might seek arguments for something she already believes; the argument-is-war metaphor does not. It also endorses the possibility of arguing/or something without arguing against anybody; and again, the argument-is-war metaphor cannot accommodate that. Specifically, explanations qualify as arguments under this conception, and this seems meet since explanations constitute a large part of many arguments. Explanation can indeed serve as a kind of justification, and justification generally is the province of argument.¶This points to a way to articulate the connection between interpretation and argumentation that was suggested earlier: in order to understand some texts, a certain kind of sympathetic reading can be necessary. This might involve speculating about an author's motives, providing a charitable interpretation for apparently inconsistent passages, or the like. From the perspective provided by thinking of arguments along the speech-act lines just presented, reading looks a lot like arguing with the author. Readers need to argue with, meaning alongside, the author rather than with, meaning against, the author, in order to enhance whatever it is that the text is saying, showing, or doing. And, needless to say, authors and readers do not have to be adversaries. The "argument" between them is not adversarial. This is not, to be sure, how students of philosophy are typically taught to read a philosophical text. They are trained to read "critically," Le., they are trained to read with a combatant's eye, an eye that is open for any weaknesses in the argument that can be turned to advantage in a critical paper. All too often we read the way we argue in another respect: we read with "our defenses up" lest we be convinced of something we didn't want to believe. "I'll be damned if I'm going to let this author teach me something new!" Since this is not the attitude we want in the classroom, we should think along different lines:¶ (1) Argument is not war; it is reciprocal reading. ¶ Speech-act approaches have shown that they can shed light on the subject of argumentation. Unfortunately, what should be understood as helpful characterizations are all too often interpreted as definitive analyses or necessary and sufficient conditions, Le., as definitions. These can then be taken as challenges to other workers in the field to find or construct both counterexamples that should belong to the category but do not fit the description, and counterexamples that do fit the description but should not count as arguments. For the example at hand, it might be pointed out that one way of enhancing a speech act is to say it with a smile, but that should hardly count as an argument. Or, again, revising a poem seems a clear example of a speech-act-enhancing activity that is just as clearly not an argument. Arguments may include interpretations, but that does not make all interpreters into arguers. Conversely, when I tell my son to wear his seat belt, and answer his question, "Why?" by offering appropriate reasons, I am not arguing for or enhancing the acceptability of any speech-act, except under some ad hoc reading, although I am certainly arguing for some act: his buckling his seat belt. While it is certainly helpful to have as wide a variety of examples as possible at hand, this can degenerate into an esoteric exercise, indeed an idle academic exercise of exactly the same sort of nit-picking that I have just done with the counter-examples here. I have taken a very illuminating characterization and managed to show that, being very, very legalistic, it is, to no one's surprise, inadequate as a definition. What we need are not new definitions, but new metaphors. Fortunately, Aristotle was wrong in thinking that metaphor is the work of genius. On the contrary, metaphor is a linguistic commonplace, something that every competent language user understands and employs (although, to be sure, creating the brilliant metaphors that permanently reshape our thoughts is no mean feat).¶ I sometimes think that what good philosophizing and, more generally, effective teaching of any kind have in common is that they revolve around the same kind of activity: the search for just the right metaphor. Metaphors are more than merely elliptical similes or stylistic affectations for embellished expression. They are vehicles for making the unfamiliar familiar, which is what makes them particularly important for education. There is, however, something funny about characterizing metaphors as linguistic devices for articulating unfamiliar thoughts by transplanting them into a more familiar context: it buys into the questionable dichotomy of thought and language. The implied model is that we think things, and then we somehow translate them into written or spoken words. Thinking and speaking or writing are not nearly as easily distinguishable as this model suggests. There is some wisdom in the old chestnut "How am I supposed to know what I think until I hear what I have to say?" Metaphors are not just elegant or clever ways of conveying new thoughts; they are also ways of thinking new thoughts, of grasping those thoughts, and even of formulating them in the first place. And this is what makes the art of metaphor so important for philosophy. Because I think of both philosophy and education this way, I think the question that we really should be addressing is not where and how arguments fit into philosophy and education, but what metaphors for arguments fit in with the goals of philosophy and education. It is especially appropriate to ask the question in this form when philosophy and education are being sung in a Pragmatist key. ¶The meaning of a metaphor is invariably, and notoriously, under-determined. This is what stymies reading them as elliptical similes. Sure, arguments are like war, but how? Everything is like everything else in some respect, if we are but clever enough to sense [sic] it. Arguments are rafts on the sea of uncertainty carrying us to the terra firma of truth. Arguments are verbal dances responding to inaudible Gricean rhythms and unknown Jungian syllogisms. Arguments are the mortar holding together the bricks out of which theories are built. Arguments are mental exercises for athletes of the intellect. It is not hard, I think, to make sense out of any of these metaphors, but it is an amazing ability nonetheless. Interpreting metaphors is nearly the art that creating them is. ¶In some respects, interpreting metaphors may actually be the greater art. The exercise of creating metaphors can with relatively little effort be extended indefinitely. Even restricting ourselves just to traffic metaphors (and getting carried away with the exercise), we can say that arguments are (i) conversational traffic jams-(ii) gridlock with a lot of honking and little movement; (iii) arguments are conversational traffic accidents; (iv) they are wrong turns, or (v) detours, or (vi) dead ends or (vii) roundabouts on the streets of discourse; or should we have said that they are (viii) short cuts to the truth at the end of the road; maybe (ix) they are long and winding roads to nowhere; or, instead, we can conceive of arguments as (x) intellectual one way roads to their conclusionsalthough maybe they are really (xi) one-lane roads but with two-way traffic. More positively, they can be thought of as a case of (xii) a merging traffic of ideas or even better as (xiii) conceptual roads under construction. ¶ Conceptual connections like these can be constructed almost at will. The list can be expanded, if not ad infinitum, then at least ad nauseam, so that almost any arbitrarily constructed metaphor, even an initially inscrutable one, such as that arguments are the road kill alongside the highways of life (ad nauseam indeed!), can be made intelligible and plausible: both arguments and road kill are to be avoided, they are the tragic end for those who innocently enter areas of high traffic, they are what can happen when we aren't careful, and so on. Admittedly, this is stretching the point, but that is exactly what metaphors do so well. Still, the fact that so many traffic metaphors are so readily available suggests that they identify an important set of features about arguments, viz., something about their internal dynamics and the possible interactions that can arise from them.¶ In contrast to the argument-as-traffic metaphors, the argument-is-war metaphor makes a different point. What it emphasizes (or creates!) is the adversarial aspect of argumentation, which is why this particular metaphor is objectionable in the classroom. But, interpretation being an art, other conclusions could also be drawn from the metaphor. There will always be an indefinitely large supply of abstractable similarities between the tenor and vehicle of a metaphor, wars and arguments in this case. Wars may involve more than just two parties, but never less than two, and we usually assume that this is true of arguments as well; wars can be ended by simple agreement of the parties involved, and so can arguments; wars are occasions that test the national resolve and sense of identity, while arguments can do the same for the individual; wars need not end with a winner and a loser, because both sides might claim victory, when in fact both sides may have lost a great deal, and there is surely a counterpart for arguments.¶ Of course, there are also great differences that might be offered as counterexamples or counterbalances to the value of this metaphor. Wars can be prevented by diplomatic efforts, so they represent a failure of diplomacy. Arguments are not always symptomatic of communicative failure. Often they are the expressly intended product of rational inquiry! Indeed, if we include rational discourse under the rubric "diplomacy," then it is precisely arguments as we "officially" conceive them that can best prevent wars! Wars can be prevented by arguing, but arguing, obviously, cannot. Argument, as rational engagement, is antithetical to military engagement, and the metaphor would then have to be thought of [sic] as an ironic reversal. (Then again, if fighting for peace can make sense, so might arguing for agreement.) If arguments are to be a positive way of addressing differences, then¶ (2) Argument is not war; it is diplomatic negotiation.¶ Two of these just-mentioned features common to war and argument merit particular attention. First, wars never end up where they started. The status quo ante bellum can never really be achieved. What starts out as a war of principle, especially when successful, might well end up as a war of conquest, and, conversely, the unsuccessful war for conquest is transformed into a war of principle. Successful defensive re-actions inevitably seek to pre-empt any possible future transgressions. What, for example, was the American Civil War all about? The Vietnam War? The Gulf War? The answers that today's history books offer differ from the answers given by those wars' own contemporaries. ¶ Something very similar happens in arguments, especially when they are thought of as verbal wars. Interestingly, Imre Lakatos has made just this point with respect to mathematical proofs, the very paradigms for the "official" picture of arguments as exercises in pure reason. IO Proofs and refutations, he argued, are two parts of the same dialectical process. Counter-examples to proposed theorems, he maintained, do not in general function as real refutations. Rather, the role they most often play in mathematics is to demand further clarification of the intended range of the thesis or to seek greater articulation in the definitions of the concepts used. The theorems that result from, or survive, this process are inevitably changed by the process. That is, what a proof is "all about" changes as the proof proceeds, and this is no less applicable to other kinds of arguments.¶ (3) Thus, argument is not war; it is growth or adaptation. ¶ Wittgenstein reached a very similar conclusion about mathematical proofs, albeit for different reasons. II A proof, he asserted, never proves what it set out to prove. Proofs establish new conceptual connections between the thesis in question and other parts of the system of mathematics. These connections are constitutive of the meanings of the concepts involved, so the meaning of the sentence proved always has new semantic-conceptual accretions. Therefore, the sentence that has been proved, the theorem, can never have exactly the same meaning as the sentence to be proved, despite their typographic identity. In just the same way, to revert to an earlier example, no poem can really ever be revised because any revisions would, in a very real sense, result in a new and different poem. Is there a way to think of arguments as altering, or even constructing, new meanings? That is, can what an argument is "all about" be subject to the same sorts of historiographic revisions as the casus belli? It seems so. ¶ (4) That is, argument is not war; it is metamorphosis.¶ The other feature common to wars and arguments I want to note is that they are multiple-agent events (or, at least, multi-voice events, to accommodate those of us who habitually argue with themselves). It takes more than one party to start a war or an argument, it takes more than one party to sustain a war or argument, and it also takes more than one to finish a war or argument. Just as a war is never really over until both sides agree to a cessation of hostilities-otherwise there will be a prolonged guerrilla war, permanent tensions, or an uneasy truce without real peace-so too an argument is never really over until some sort of consensus has been achieved-lest there be continued verbal sniping, simmering resentments, or a lingering grudge beneath the surface. Arguments might result in situations that are analogous to the results of wars, but there is also the possibility that they end otherwise. Arguments may result in an exchange of ideas, rather than just the imposition of one side's ideas on the other. And this is certainly a legitimate pedagogical role for arguments. In the classroom, then, ¶ (5) Argument should not even be like war; it should be a kind of cross-pollination, leading to hybridization. ¶Alternatively, arguments can end in with the construction of a new conceptual order, as the Second World War gave birth to the United Nations. Ideally, in seminar ¶ (6) Argument is not at all war; it is brainstorming. ¶The best arguments, then, rather than being destructively adversarial, involve a constructive co-operation between their participants. If debate is to be contstructive for everyone involved, then ¶ (7) Instead of being a kind of war, argument can be more like a barnraising.¶Although the language of warfare is so readily used to describe arguments, there is a difference that is both obvious and important, but still easy to overlook: arguments, like brainstorming sessions or barn-raisings, can be desirable in a way that wars cannot. If we focus on the possible outcomes rather than the origins, the ends rather than the beginnings, then one way to conceptualize arguments is as those events in rational discourse that tend to create or lead to consensus. This combines the transformative-constructivist aspect with the multiple-agency aspect of arguments in a way that accommodates the move from philosophy as the pursuit-of-truth to philosophy as the pursuit-of-wisdom by shifting the balance in emphasis from (to borrow a phrase from Richard Rorty) objectivity to solidarity, while simultaneously respecting the possibility of non-competitive or even cooperative argumentation for educational ends. Simply put: "Let's hash it out" does not have to mean "let's fight it out." ¶Perhaps arguments are more like town meetings than anything else, because they are sometimes contentious, but sometimes co-operative; there may be several opposing factions, or only interested but as yet undecided citizens; sometimes they are divisive and inconclusive, but sometimes they are indeed constructive; they may begin with a consensus for action, and serve merely as strategy sessions for orchestrating actions, or they may begin with a cacophony of voices-and end the same way. For all its openness to the variety of forms arguments can take, the purposes they can serve, and the many possible outcomes that can result from them, in the end, I don't think the town-meeting metaphor serves very well. It will not challenge the argument-is-war metaphor, if only because town meetings do not occupy as prominent a place in our conceptual geography as war. War is, however, a dangerous metaphor, particularly when it has been allowed to form, to deform, argumentation in the classroom. Other metaphors are available, and still others that are even better are waiting to be created, but in the end I am skeptical that any single metaphor can fit all the shapes that arguments take or serve all the purposes that arguments serve. In that case, we do not really need to come up with a new metaphor to reflect and reform our practice; we need instead to traffic in as many metaphors as possible-including all those traffic metaphors!

# 2AC

### Exec

Their paranoid mythologizing sanitizes imperial domination and erupts into pyrotechnic violence – fear of threats to hegemony causes cycles of enemy construction, making their impacts inevitable.

McClintock 9 (Anne, Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, "Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib," Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,”[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f4) and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. [End Page 51] I have come to feel that we urgently need to make apparent [sic] (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f5) Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself unnoticeable [sic], casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on conceiving [sic] the violence that the imperial state attempts to render unnoticeable [sic], while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f6) Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. [End Page 52] Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f7) Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence.[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f8) Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.”[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f9) Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence**,** and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. [End Page 53] Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

### Terror

Drones policy is shrouded in secrecy – debate is impossible because of the lack of transparency – instead of assessing the information selectively leaked by the government, focus should be on the production of knowledge behind policy.

Toth, ’13 [Kate Toth, London School of Economics, Dissertation; “REMOTE-CONTROLLED WAR: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTANCING OF STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY”; Apr 27, 2013; http://www.academia.edu/3125323/REMOTE-CONTROLLED\_WAR\_IMPLICATIONS\_OF\_THE\_DISTANCING\_OF\_STATE-SPONSORED\_VIOLENCE\_ON\_AMERICAN\_DEMOCRACY]

With regard to drones, what the public knows has been released through leaks to the press that were likely approved by the President (Engelhardt, 2012). Though the government now claims the right to assassinate Americans along with foreigners through the drone program, “informed public debate and judicial oversight” are impossible because “its drone program is so secret [the government] can't even admit to its existence” (Freed Wessler, 2012). That is, except via leaks that allow Obama to craft a politically advantageous narrative (Friedersdorf, 2012a). Meanwhile, the use of drones has exploded domestically, and again, “citizens lack a basic right to know who is operating the drones circling their houses, what information is being collected and how it will be used” (ABC News, 2012). The Bush administration politicized science (Beck, 1992) by notoriously editing reports on climate change and pressuring scientists (Coglianese, 2009). This is instructive for the current debate as it exhibits that one cannot simply assess the information released, but examine this knowledge within a political context, harking back to Foucault’s (1997) production of knowledge. Writing about the covert drone strikes, Friedersdorf (2012b) in The Atlantic asked, “in what sense would we be living in a representative democracy if neither the bulk of Congress nor the people” are told about the strikes? One of the lingering questions raised from this debate is, how different is it if we were told the bare minimum of facts via leaks, so still preventing effective debate, versus being told nothing at all? When President Obama took office, in the memo outlining his “Transparency and Open Government” initiative, it was written that transparency will “ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration” and that this transparency will “strengthen our democracy” (White House, 2009). This is what Obama believes transparency has the power to achieve, and it falls in line with the access to information that Diamond and Morlino (2004) highlight as key to accountability in democracy. President Obama’s track record is, perhaps, an example of not striking the right balance between what, and how much, to release. However, given that many of the steps he has taken, both in terms of transparency of existing programs and secrecy regarding proliferation of new programs such as drones, it does not seem likely that this is unintentional. Transparency relies on a strong civil society to use the information effectively, or press for it to be released (Etzioni, 2010); perhaps this lack of accountability is also indicative of the weakness of current American civil society and media.

### War on Poverty

Perm – do both.

Aff accesses critical sequencing question – The War Metaphor justified the war on poverty – before affirming a metaphor they must understand it’s basis.

Elkins, ‘10 [Jeremy Elkins, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley. Professor in Political Science at Bryn Mawr College. He has taught at the University of California, Berkeley and the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he served as chair of the Legal Studies Program; “The Model of War”, 2010; Political Theory 38(2)]

The United States emerged from World War II as the dominant military power in the world, and soon established itself as the leader in the western cold war alliance. It is not surprising that at such a moment, the language of war would be, as it were, turned inward and invoked as a metaphor for a national commitment to solving domestic problems. Nor is it surprising that this language should be particularly favored by the executive, whose authority in wartime is at its greatest. After the American role in liberating Europe and the assertion of American power in Korea, Latin America, Indochina, and elsewhere, it is easy enough to understand why President Johnson, in seeking a bold policy initiative to help define his presidency in the wake of the Kennedy assassination and in attempting (as he later put it) to “rally the nation, to sound a call to arms that would stir people in the government, in private industry, and on the campuses to lend their talents to a massive effort to eliminate the evil”5 of American poverty, would turn to the language of war. It is similarly understandable why those who desired increased funding for cancer research and who sought to persuade President Nixon that with an all-out effort, a cure for cancer was within sight,6 might adopt that language, and why the President and Congress would do so in turn; for even as the Vietnam war dragged on with no clear victory in sight, and even as that war came to divide the nation, the idea of war remained closely associated with that of a unified and centrally organized national effort and with the kind of unconditional victory that the United States had demanded and helped to secure against the Axis powers.

Reject the negative for perpetuating the enemy creation behind the war-on-poverty metaphor that rhetorically positions those in poverty as enemies –

The war on poverty metaphor externalizes the poor and causes violent exclusion.

Elkins, ‘10 [Jeremy Elkins, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley. Professor in Political Science at Bryn Mawr College. He has taught at the University of California, Berkeley and the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he served as chair of the Legal Studies Program; “The Model of War”, 2010; Political Theory 38(2)]

As with cancer, a true national commitment to eradicating poverty would have required turning very deeply inwards and confronting (as many of the most ardent antipoverty warriors advocated) a host of conditions and policies that contributed to the perpetuation of poverty. Yet despite some initial willingness to confront the deeper causes of poverty, Johnson was acutely sensitive to the resistance of many in the electorate to the idea that the body politic needed to be healed and to those segments of the middle class whose interests would be threatened by reform. As the war on poverty took shape, Johnson thus insisted that the funding for antipoverty programs not threaten middle-class tax cuts (which effectively eliminated most proposals for job creation programs), backed off on plans to tie poverty programs to racial integration in housing when this was opposed by Southerners and some Northern big city mayors, pressed to revise the centerpiece Community Action Program when it threatened local elites and bureaucracies, and refused to take on a long list of other structural contributors to poverty.24 None of this was, needless to say, a result of the adoption of war language. But that language helped to justify the limited scope of the antipoverty program by reinforcing the notion that poverty was not so much a condition of the body politic as one lying outside of it, and that, therefore, as one antipoverty warrior put it, whatever the war on poverty did was a supererogatory effort by “us” for “them,” a form of noblesse oblige by the nation for others who have been struck by a tragic condition.25 And while, ironically, the image of the poor as living outside of the nation was initially employed by members of the administration in depicting the war on poverty as a kind of economic irredentist movement to extend the national “prosperity . . . [to] those who have been kept outside.”26 The representation, however, of the problem of poverty as also essentially “outside” of the nation meant that the poor had no special claim on the nation; for while they were in the body politic, they were not quite of it. This tendency to externalize not only poverty as an abstraction, but along with it the poor took several other forms as well. In one, the true body politic was identified as a certain kind of cultural community in relation to which the poor were outsiders, living, like gypsies, in a “culture of poverty” on the outskirts of the nation. And for many whites, the conception of the poor as a kind of domestic alien was further reinforced when the focus of the war shifted from Appalachian poverty to black ghetto poverty, and all the more so when the administration responded to ghetto unrest by redirecting the war on poverty, to a significant degree, as a means of pacifying the ghettoes. That transformation—from, as it were, a “hot war” on poverty to a cold war of containment—reached its limiting point in the Nixon administration, which dropped talk of a war on poverty entirely and focused on keeping the ghettos under control. But the termination of the war on poverty was in this respect a progression—by no means, of course, a necessary one—of a tendency encouraged by the idea that poverty itself was not part of the fabric of the nation but an alien force. The “war on poverty,” like the “war on cancer,” thus contained an internal tension: the more “unconditional,” the more like a full-scale war, the more it would have to focus on domestically produced causes. Yet the language of war came to represent the problem as though it were constitutionally, essentially, external to the real nation: an army that had invaded the national body rather than a condition that was the product of it.

### 2AC FW MAIN

Aff reenchants policymaking and is prerequisite to framework by opening space for alternatives to falsely universal solutions.

Parsons, ‘10 [Wayne Parson is Professor of Public Policy at Queen Mary, University of London. He is currently Visiting Professor in policy sciences at FLACSO, Mexico and the Catholic University of Lille; “Modernism redux: po-mo problems and hi-mo public policy” from “Public Management in the Postmodern Era: Challenges and Prospects”; 2010]

The shift towards the discourse of policy capacity involved therefore using the (best) bits of earlier (technocratic and managerialist) discourse (1960s hits), and re- packing them as ‘modernization’ and building policy/ governance capacities. Dror’s report to the Club of Rome, The Capacity to Govern, is redolent of a musty old technocratic ethos which was itself a remix of the kind of arguments he had put forward (in Public Policymaking Reexamined, 1968) before Neil Armstrong took that one small step: if government was going to solve problems, it had to get a lot smarter! Fast forward to the 1990s and the obsession with the challenge of ‘governance’ and ‘hollowed out states’ and the need for policy makers to improve their network steering capacities, and the solution for Dror was the same, except more so: plus ça change. The more complex problems became, the more government had to reassert its capacity to steer and navigate. In a similar vein, the World Bank, which had, from the beginning, a dominant role in the production of policy analysis, launched its remix: ‘we are the Knowledge Bank’ (‘things can only get better’) in 1996. No longer was the Bank just in the business of lending money and telling countries what to do: it mutated into a Bank that liked to share knowledge and build in- country analytical capacity. It was the Bank that was in the business of ‘technical guidance’. The plan was for the Bank to (apparently) vacate the driving seat but still provide the maps. It was still doing the navigating. And, at a time when academic students of public policy were warning about the dangers of thinking of policy making as a set of rational stages (Sabatier, 1999), HM government was using the rational model as the basis of creating a more ‘professional’ approach to policy making by remixing the policy stages model with a good dose of ye olde strategic management (Parsons, 2001). One could argue that the high- modernism remix of the Bank, in Dror and in HM government, was symptomatic of the remixing going on elsewhere from the mid- 1990s onwards. As politics was becoming more ‘non- ideological’ and ‘what matters is what works’ became the mantra of the modernizing faith, the policy process and policy analysis could be portrayed as essentially technical and managerial in orientation. In the absence of political or ideological grand narratives, the high- modernism of policy analysis became a kind of default setting: a ‘we don’t have an ideological agenda, we are just interested in what works, sharing knowledge and policy skills training’ grand narrative. In this case, we might read the high- modernism manifested in the 1990s as the product of the ‘end of ideology’ and a world without grand narratives. The big idea was that there was no big idea: ‘evidence’ should drive policy, and techniques and tools and models would improve the problem solving capacity of both the developed and developing world. Indeed, the 1990s remix was in many ways far more technocratic than discussed in Trevor Smith’s account of the 1960s and early 1970s. To govern was to design targets and specify outcomes and results and to manage, monitor and evaluate (even risk) so as to realize these targets. Thus it came to pass that a postmodern world was to give rise to high- modern modes of policy making and analysis. Highmodernism in public policy was just another postmodern remix of a sort: an exercise in self- referencing and technocratic bricolage. Perhaps the whole concept of ‘postmodern’, however, is not helpful when we come to think about alternatives to the kind of modernism we have experienced since the 1990s. It is possible to say that postmodernist describes the present human condition, but it does not take us far when we have to think in terms of what to do about health, housing, education, the economy, and so on. It may provide us with an account of the policy process, but it hardly seems relevant for thinking about how can we design policies. A postmodern policy – as a theory of a problem and, heaven forbid, a grand narrative – seems a contradiction in terms. Postmodernism can do a good job of deconstructing the world but appears to rule out constructing an alternative. The postmodern rejection of theory logically also rules out the idea of a ‘policy’ and ‘analysis’. If there is no privileged reading of a text and voice, and uncertainty is all in all, what then? It is a grand narrative that prohibits any other grand narrative. Do postmodern tools, therefore, have any place in the professional policy maker’s toolbox? On the face of it, no: but that may be the professional policy maker’s loss. What is lacking in the existing box of delights provided by the BWIs and others is a critical disposition: a way of looking at problems as constructed discourses, which serve to lock today’s problems in yesterday’s language. Deconstruction can challenge the assumptions and the mindset embedded in a policy language (Schram, 1993). As such it can be used, so it is argued, to help practitioners better understand the arguments they use and the alternatives to existing policy designs (Gillroy, 1997; Miller, 2002). Postmodern approaches have much to offer modern policy designers: above all they bring to the fore the importance of playfulness in the design process. Policy analysis as art and craft has been seen as the sole preserve of the species homo sapiens, but perhaps critical approaches also need to give homo ludens a try. Policy analysis in a wicked world has to deal (above all) with paradox, a world in which solutions do not exist, and in which meaning is not so obvious or so available or so desirable; a world in which we do not possess the luxury of a single perspective but have to deal with problems as existing within a multiplicity of ways of understanding [sic]. Playfulness requires an analysis of problems which recognizes the role of diff erent forms and kinds of knowledge. Like the fool, homo ludens should be licensed to poke fun and prick the bubbles of the powerful as they float around the corridors of power. The postmodern deconstructive tools in the box are the pig’s bladder and the motley: the tools of the fool. In this sense, policy analysis requires the same kind of playfulness that is a vital aspect of all human problem solving and design. Postmodern foolishness, above all, can serve to create space in which innovation (and a more critical modernity) can emerge. The postmodern fool plays the part that all the very best fools have played at the courts of the mighty: opening up space by challenging the supposed wisdom of the powerful, replacing clarity and dogma with ambiguity and doubt through verbal dexterity and ‘wit’. This opening up of policy space to ambiguity is especially important in the light of Wildavsky’s argument that, over time, the policy space becomes ever more dense and crowded: policies overlap and bump into one another and policies end up their own cause. Postmodernism can create space by questioning the fundamental (modernist) assumptions which support the architecture of policies and institutions: it does not presume to ‘speak truth to power’ but it interrogates and pricks that which is regarded as truth. The jester does this by being an outsider on the inside. The fool possesses the skill of being the outsider, the one whose cunning wit questions meaning and opens up the spaces between the words. As Hugh Miller shows, it can lampoon the contradictions and stupidities of supposedly neutral and objective forms of instrumental rationality that are embodied in bureaucracy and managerialism, and thereby expose solutions as little more than ‘bumper sticker’ slogans (Miller, 2002). So, ‘Vesti la giubba’ since postmodern motley is appropriate attire for the high- modern court: a court that is always at risk of believing in the power of rationality and its capacity for intellectual cogitation and is consequently invariably prey to taking itself seriously, self- deception, closedmindedness and groupthink. Postmodern analysis is the joker in the pack, the wild card that does not belong: the post modern analyst is neither a Jack, Queen or King, or a member of any suit in the pack. As such, postmodern policy analysis requires a very diff erent ‘skill set’ for professional policy makers than those which are generally deemed necessary. The postmodern fool may serve to create a more playful context for policy making: and in doing so it does not ‘postmodernise’ public policy per se, but may well contribute to its reenchantment. A reenchanted public policy would be less ‘post’ modern than a more critical, knowing and playful form of modernism.3 It was Max Weber who argued that the fate of our modern times was characterized by ‘rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world’ (Weber, 1991a: 155). This ‘entzauberung der Welt’ would, as a result of the spread of ‘rational, empirical knowledge’, transform the world into little more than a ‘causal mechanism’ (Weber, 1991b: 350–51). The modern world was, he gloomily forecast, doomed to be driven by the engine of disenchanted rationalization ‘until the last ton of fossilised coal was burnt’ (Weber, 1976: 181). Until then, ‘not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a night of icy darkness and hardness’ (Weber, 1991c: 128). The new high priests of this dark, hard age would be the scientists, economists, bureaucrats, and all those whose claim to power was grounded in their claims to knowledge and technical expertise. A brief read through some of the recent outputs of the BWIs graphically illustrates that, if we ever doubted it, we still live in the realms of entzauberung, where the only knowledge or wisdom that counts is that possessed by those who do the counting and write the ‘guides’ and compile the toolboxes: a world in which rational analytical knowledge and bureaucratic hierarchy always triumph over local and more tacit forms of practical wisdom and where the loud and strident ‘grand narratives’ of the powerful all too often crowd out and shout down the stories told around the camp fires that warm the hard icy darkness. Well, the day when the last ton of fossil fuel is used up is not so far off : in which case, it is valid to ask what kinds of roads might lead to the warmer, sunlit and soft lands of neuverzauberung4 or ‘reenchantment’? The reenchantment of public policy begins when we recognize that the problems we face are of a wicked nature: they do not have ‘solutions’ which can be arrived at purely through the exercise of reason and analysis. We face problems for which causal relationships are so complex that we cannot know when one problem ends

and another begins, or whether the problems themselves have been caused by previous or existing policies. We confront a world in which ‘what works?’ is a simplistic and non sensical question. ‘What works?’, like probability, is a poor guide to action in a world in which ‘problems’ are not continuous over time and space. The fact that a policy had worked in one context does not mean that it will work in another. In the land of neuverzauberung causes and eff ects, and means and ends, are complex and confusing. We realize that we have to design solutions even though we can know so very little. It is a world in which students and practitioners have to become more modest about their capacities to (as Lindblom put it) ‘understand and shape society’. A reenchanted policy space is therefore a domain lacking the most powerful of modernist myths: there are, alas, no ‘zauberkugel’ – magic bullets – in the land of neuverzauberung. It is policy making that lays no claim to have magic bullets, silver or otherwise, which can be used in policy wars to hit targets.5 Just as there are no magic bullets for cancer or obesity or any other bodily ailment, in a reenchanted policy space we have to come to terms with the fact that there are no magic bullets for our ‘public’ ailments. One size does not fit all. The ‘policy’ as universal solution is recognized for what it is: the ubiquitous snake oil of modern political discourse. On reflection, the landscape of neuverzauberung in many ways off ers a very postmodern prospect: it is confusing and complex, and full of competing ideas of what counts as progress in theory and practice. Policy studies itself has always been a field with no defined boundaries or borders. It consequently has a topography which has been formed by the transgression of intellectual boundaries. Indeed, the mission of the policy sciences movement was (in Lasswell’s terms) to integrate knowledge. So, although the policy approach challenges disciplinary boundaries (like postmodernism) it does so in the belief that human knowledge could and should be integrated so as to solve human problems (so very non- postmodern). Hence, as Wildavsky (1987) observed, policy analysis has ‘expropriated lands’ from many disciplines, and for this reason any attempt to plot where the approach is (or is going) in a cartographic sense will ‘not take us very far’. In fact, in many respects, the policy approach is rather like Schumpeter’s defi nition of economics as being an ‘agglomeration of ill- coordinated and overlapping fi elds of research’, in which the frontiers of the field are ‘incessantly shifting’ (Schumpeter, 1954: 10). Policy analysis as an art and craft requires a variety of tools: most of which are ‘borrowed’. Given this, we should expect a reenchanted public policy to be far more diverse, if not downright eclectic and positively kleptic. If we understand public policy as an ‘agglomeration of ill- coordinated and overlapping fi elds’ which focuses on how human beings design problems and solutions to those conditions they consider to be public, then the toolbox must perforce contain a diverse range of approaches to be of any use to either students or practitioners. Progress in the past was very much about the search for a grand theory, the big idea. But the integration of knowledge relevant to analysis of the policy process, and for and in the process, cannot and should not be understood as an attempt at unification – or positivistic consilience (Wilson, 1998). In which case, progress in public policy may best be viewed as about increasing diversity and competition between different approaches, frameworks, tools and models.